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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA: 





While ostensibly a response to a critique, the main goal of this Article is to 
demonstrate how easily conventional wisdom, usually shaped by the media and 
politics, can corrupt scholarship when it is simply presupposed by those engaged 
in what should be an academic polemic, yet often also includes ‘activism in 
scholarship’. The examples of approved narratives in the West on Yugoslavia and 




David Polizzi, editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Theoretical and Philosophical 
Criminology, has published a critical response to my ‘What’s A Just War Theorist?’.1 He 
characterized my ‘exploration and critique’ of just war theory, as developed by Michael 
Walzer in 1970s, as ‘provocative’. This suggests some disagreement with my position, which 
can only be welcomed by any scholar, as long as criticisms are well reasoned and factually 
accurate. These provisos, unfortunately, were not followed in this case. In fact, what should 
be a critical response appears to be little more than an appeal to conventional wisdom on 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
2
 Hence, in this Article I set out to explore, from ethical and 
methodological points of view, a more wide spread phenomenon of how conventional 
wisdom, usually shaped by the media and politics, corrupt fact based scholarship, particularly 
when that conventional wisdom or the standard narrative is simply presupposed as factually 
accurate by those engaged in what should be an exercise of scholarship and academic 
polemic. We may refer to this as a novel error in reasoning: the Appeal to Conventional 
Wisdom fallacy. I also focus on the contribution within the academic habitus
3
 of what passes 
for scholarship in constructing conventional wisdom as a result of practicing what I call 
‘activism in scholarship’. It is my purpose to demonstrate these errors and fallacies here using 
the two examples of conventional wisdom on Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990’s 
presented in separate sections of the article. But first, in the section immediately following, I 
shall present the relevant details of the disagreements between Polizzi and myself and 
connect the appeal to conventional wisdom fallacy to ‘activism in scholarship’. 
 
                                                 
*Associate Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department, Portland State University. 
1 Aleksandar Jokic, ‘What’s A Just War Theorist?’ (2012) 4 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical 
Criminology 91. 
2 David Polizzi, ‘Just War, Genocide, or Necessity: A Critical Response to Jokic’ (2012) 4 Journal of 
Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology 115. 
3 I use this term in the well-known sense developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. It refers to a set 
of values, rules, practices, dispositions, and expectations that are acquired by a social group (or community) in a 
way dependent on the group’s history and collective memory, which turns a certain behaviour or belief into an 
element of that group's structure when the original purpose of that behaviour or belief can no longer be recalled 
and becomes socialized into individuals who belong to the group or share its culture. We live, I believe, in a 
period when the effort to socialize us to accept ‘activism in scholarship’ (and similarly ‘activism in journalism’) 
as positive new values even though this is in clear violation of long standing methodological standards of 
scholarship, which is supposed to be truth and discovery oriented rather than ideological or interest based. I 
develop these points further in this section, elaborating an important contrast between ‘activism in scholarship’ 
and ‘activism with scholarship’. 
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THE CONTROVERSY: JUST WAR THEORY AND AGGRESSION 
 
In ‘What’s A Just War Theorist?’ I noted that the resurgence of just war theory within 
the moral normative order should have been surprising, especially because it ended up being 
used as a tool to argue in favour of specific US (and in general Western or Israeli) military 
campaigns as morally justified (regardless of whether or not they were in violation of 
international law). The surprise at its resurgence should have occurred because just war 
theory, though it originated in a Catholic theological context formulated by St Augustine and 
was quickly understood to have moral implication, in fact developed by the end of 19
th
 
century, its final formulation as a theory applicable in the purely secular domain of a legal 
interpretation within positive international law. Taken as a contemporary legal theory it 
consists of two components: the jus ad bellum is that part of international law governing 
resort to international armed conflicts. The jus in bello is the law of war properly so 
formulated, namely, the body of rules governing the conduct of parties engaged in 
international armed conflict. 
Extreme caution is in order when considering the revival of the medieval just war 
theory and its application in the moral (rather than simply legal) domain—a revival we have 
witnessed in the last third of the 20
th
 century (initiated in Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust 
Wars). There are two reasons for caution here, a theoretical and a practical one. On the 
moral-theoretical side the point is well made by the most important Enlightenment thinker, 
Immanuel Kant, who saw war as beyond the rules of good and evil, and hence not a practice 
that can be just or unjust. It belongs, he claimed, to the domain of necessity, and the only 
imperative regarding war is to end it as soon as possible. Moral philosophers, in particular 
Kantians, thus cannot condone this endeavour by just war theorists for they see them, in 
inimitable words of Judith Shklar, as ‘encouraging people to enter upon wars recklessly and 
then baptizing [their] own side with the holy water of justice. Every enemy can easily be 
made to look the aggressor’.4 The significance of Kant’s arguments is that no moral rules are 
possible that would confer a moral-theoretic imprimatur on some wars characterized by 
specific attributes. Any violent conflict could be claimed to satisfy such descriptions whether 
it did or not. Hence, the entire project should be rejected. Kant, writing at the time when a 
decisive transition of just war theory from the moral to the secular domain of international 
law was taking place, was opposed to the idea of constructing (moral) ‘theories’ that would 
render specific wars ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, for an endeavour of this sort could easily be used to 
rhetorically turn even an obvious aggression into a (morally) ‘good war’. 
This brings us to the practical problem with the application of the just war theory in 
the period of history that saw the unprecedented progress in international law where, 
regarding jus ad bellum, aggression was marked as the supreme crime in international law, as 
per the Nuremberg precedent and embedded as such in the UN Charter. Even more so as a 
number of elements of such crime were introduced and refined in the positive international 
law regulating jus in bello, such as the Nuremberg Principles or the four Geneva 
Conventions, and so on. This opens up the unpleasant possibility that judgments based on 
international law and just war theoretical (presumably moral) judgments about a specific 
violent episode could come in opposition to each other. What to do about a war that is 
deemed ‘illegal but good’? A powerful state, bent on waging war, could in such a case want 
to emphasize the alleged moral justness of its decision to go to war and ignore its (supreme) 
illegality. I argued that this was inaugurated as a practice in the first instance with the case of 
the US-led NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999. Similarly, I noted the peculiar 
nature of ex post facto revisions of the ‘factual’ violations—i.e. the conventional wisdom or 
                                                 
4 Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Harvard University Press 1984) 80. 




narrative—of the existing legal rules of war as morally justified (in order for the ‘good side’ 
to win the war), are regularly made by the practitioners of just war theory. Hence, I 
concluded my inquiry with the claim that in virtue of their application of just war theory to 
concrete cases of international violence, just war theorists themselves teeter dangerously 
towards actually committing war crimes, both on the count of incitement by agitating in 
favour of aggression (by calling on powerful countries to intervene militarily in other 
countries in violation of international law) and on the count of aiding and abetting aggressing 
troops to commit war crimes (by the promise of ex post facto morally absolving them). What 
just war theory effectively accomplishes, therefore, is decriminalization of aggression, when 
conducted by the most powerful countries against the weak ones, and decriminalization of the 
war crimes committed by troops of the most powerful states in the military theatres on the 
territories of the weaker states.  
On the way to this conclusion I considered whether just war theorists, who like 
Walzer do not hesitate to apply their wisdom to prophesise about moral attributes of specific 
wars, are a kind of (international) activists and I argue against this type of mixing of 
scholarship and activism. I show the dangers of this sort of activism in the example of Alison 
des Forges, an expert who at the same time openly acted as an activist in court, and whose 
testimony did not fare well in the analysis of the judges of the Federal Appeals Court of 
Canada in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (FCA). In her 
testimony Des Forges ‘acknowledged that, as a human rights activist, she could not claim 
objectivity although attempting to maintain neutrality as between political factions’. In their 
analysis the Appeals Court judges explicitly rejected her testimony as a result of her open 
activism and concluded that ‘Ms. Des Forges testified as an activist with a clear bias against 
Mugesera and an implacable determination to have his head’.5 
On the basis of examples like these, and given that just war theorists engage in 
practices essentially of this nature, I argued a more general point that activism and 
scholarship are incompatible activities that cannot simultaneously characterize what one 
does. They cannot occur simultaneously because activism quickly consumes scholarship. 
This consuming of one by the other can go further than the case of activism overwhelming 
scholarship just mentioned, as in the case of an intelligence operative who takes as cover the 
role of an activist; in this latter case, activism is consumed by the intelligence operation. 
Hence, proper scholarship must be conducted independently of any activism or intelligence 
scheme. The just war theorists clearly do not appear well positioned in this regard.  
In order to clarify my position even further for the sake of the present discussion, I 
want to introduce here a distinction between ‘activism in scholarship’ and ‘activism with 
scholarship’. The above objections are meant against the former type of practice as it leads to 
findings and recommendations that are not based on proper methodology or correct facts, but 
instead on ideological grounds or are entirely conventional wisdom or narrative based. To 
crystalize this distinction we can take as example the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu is not only the best example of someone who practiced what I call ‘activism 
with scholarship’, but he also extensively theorized it, while at the same time he rejected 
‘activism in scholarship’ as heteronomous and irresponsible, in his conception of ‘committed 
scientist’ or ‘public intellectual’. In order to count as intellectuals ‘cultural producers’, seen 
by Bourdieu as ‘bi-dimensional beings’, must satisfy two conditions. First, they ‘must belong 
to an intellectually autonomous field, one independent of religious, political, economic or 
other powers, and they must respect that field’s particular laws’, which means that the 
questions they ask, problems they formulate, and methods they use seeking answers must be 
                                                 
5 Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (FCA) is available online at 
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2003/2003fca325/2003fca325.html (accessed last on March 9, 2013).  
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de facto recognized as belonging to the field by its practitioners. Second, ‘they must deploy 
their specific expertise and authority in their particular intellectual domain in a political 
activity outside it’.6 In other words, for Bourdieu, the proper engagement of a scholar or 
intellectual is outside academia but relying on the tools of her specialization to accomplish 
political interventions. 
The former condition spells out the existence of autonomous fields as the foundation 
of symbolic authority, which when exercised outside scholarship or academia, as 
interventions in politics, per the later condition, represents the proper domain of civil 
engagements for intellectuals equipped with scientifically-obtained knowledge. Thus, 
Bourdieu endeavoured to keep scholarly methodology rigorous and free from all external 
interests be they economic or political. Bourdieu’s own activism was motivated by his belief 
that ‘those who have the good fortune to be able to devote their lives to the study of the social 
world cannot stand aside, neutral and indifferent, from the struggles in which the future of 
that world is at stake’.7 
He argued that his theorising of habitus, field and symbolic power gave him greater 
understanding of the institutions he sought to influence. He developed a view of multinational 
corporations, international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and the US as 
together embodying ‘the cunning of imperialist reason’8 in an international situation in which 
‘the global community has given carte blanche to the US to enforce a particular kind of order’ 
in which ‘relations of force overwhelmingly favour the dominant’ and ‘might alone makes 
right’.9 Thus his engagement based on the findings of his research included his many appeals 
and protests in Le Monde Diplomatique and appearances at rallies and demonstrations, where 
he spoke against the government’s neoliberal strategies of welfare cuts, immigration policies 
and complicit journalism.
10
 This is ‘activism with scholarship’ in its most robust form. But, 
importantly, he does not see this as a solitary effort, instead Bourdieu encouraged ‘all 
competent researchers to unite their efforts with those of responsible activists in order to 
collectively discuss and elaborate a set of analyses and proposals for progress that today exist 
only in the virtual state of private and isolated thoughts or circulate in fringe publications, 
confidential reports, or esoteric journals’.11At the same time Bourdieu rejected ‘activism in 
scholarship’ as a threat to autonomy, for its presence in any field signals dependence with 
regard to external economic, political or religious powers, which erodes any symbolic 
authority necessary for proper civic engagement by an intellectual. As such it also represents 
a kind of incompetence as a violation of the basic value of all authentic scholarship, its 
‘interest in disinterestedness’. Thus, when Bourdieu calls for full adherence to scholarship of 
‘the collective intellectual’ he is envisioning ‘an improbable but indispensible combination: 
scholarship with commitment, that is a collective politics of intervention in the political field 
that follows, as much as possible, the rules that govern the scientific field’. This Bourdieusian 
account gives us clear sense of the dual failure of ‘activism in scholarship’ that amounts to 
                                                 
6 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World’ (1989) 81 
Telos 81 99, 99. 
7 Pierre Bourdieu, Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2 (Verso 2003) 11. 
8 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant,‘On the Cunning of the Imperialist Reason’ (1999) 16 Theory, Culture & 
Society 41. 
9 Quoted in Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby, ‘Introduction to Second Edition: Committed Scholarship’ 3, 6 in 
Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby, eds Habitus: A Sense of Place (Ashgate 2005).  
10 More than a decade after his death, given the predicament France and Europe are currently in, all of these 
initiatives undertaken by Bourdieu seem particularly relevant, and I see this Article as humble attempt to offer a 
philosophical application of specific conceptualizations by the accomplished theoretician from a cognate 
discipline of sociology. 
11 Bourdieu (n 7) 15. 




pseudo-scholarship (because it lacks autonomy) and fake activism (as it is neither collective 
nor universal).  
In his critical response Polizzi takes issue with my views by advancing the following 
claims: (i) NATO’s 1999 attack against Yugoslavia was not an aggression; (ii) it was a 
justified ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the on-going genocide committed by the Yugoslav 
government forces in Kosovo; (iii) it stopped a continuation of genocidal policies initiated by 
Serbian forces in Bosnia; (iv) which policies and Serbian acts inspired Western just war 
theorists and other activists to call for military means in order to oppose the genocide; (v) and 
motivated NATO action by referring to their decisive humanitarian failure to intervene in the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994. In order to support these five claims Polizzi makes appeals to 
conventional wisdom on both Yugoslavia and Rwanda and relies on authors who clearly 
practice ‘activism in scholarship’. For this reason, rather than simply responding to Polizzi, 
my goal in the remaining parts of the Article is to explore the larger phenomenon of the 
methodological and moral implications of assuming ‘conventional wisdom’ in what should 
instead be a product of scholarship. 
 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON YUGOSLAVIA 
 
Polizzi starts with an unexplained assumption that I must be a citizen of Serbia. He 
makes that clear by stating that I ‘chastised’ those elites in Serbia—my ‘fellow 
countrymen’—who awarded an honorary doctorate to someone, in this case Michael Walzer, 
a person famous for advocating aggression against their own country. Is Polizzi’s idea that a 
US citizen (me) could not possibly object to an award given to another American (Walzer) in 
whatever foreign country?
12
 Yet, despite Polizzi’s ideas, this is exactly what I was doing. 
In fact, I took it for granted, as an obvious judgment, that there must be something 
wrong (perhaps an expression of the ‘colonized mind-set’, in Albert Memmi’s sense of the 
phrase) with individuals who would want to celebrate those who had successfully called for a 
supreme crime of international law—aggression13—to be committed against their own 
country, during which, by the way, they themselves or their children could have been killed; 
hence my descriptions of bombed out and pulverized buildings in the centre of Belgrade, not 
far from where those people work and live. Yet, this is not obvious to Polizzi, and he enjoys 
speculating about the ways those intellectual elites in Serbia might have been right in 
celebrating Walzer. Suddenly, and completely unmotivated by any explanation as if we must 
all know what is on his mind, Polizzi invokes ‘this genocide’ to make his point: ‘Could it be 
that these intellectual elites actually agreed with the idea that this genocide needed to be 
brought to an end?’ But, what genocide? Does he mean the genocide that was already under 
way somewhere in Serbia? What was that genocide to which he oddly attributes this ‘need to 
end,’ in the year 1999 in Yugoslavia? His attempts to isolate the event he is trying to discuss 
are unsuccessful, and rather serve to further confuse the time and place of pertinent events 
that one could meaningfully talk about in connection to any of my arguments. 
My statement clearly related to the 78 day bombing campaign, from 24 March to 6 
June 1999, which was in violation of international law and without UN approval, and was 
                                                 
12 Yet, many Americans were outraged at a Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Barak Obama at the time he barely 
entered the White House. 
13 As Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials stated: 
‘aggression...is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime, differing only from other 
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’ A few realize that this statement 
made by justice Jackson was also formulated verbatim in the IMT judgment and preceded by a distinctly 
Kantian phrase ‘War is essentially an evil thing’. Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 186. 
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carried out by the US led NATO air forces against Yugoslavia (then consisting of just two 
republics of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro). 
Rather than referring to a clearly identifiable historical event, Polizzi talks of some vague 
event ‘arguably initiated by Serbian and Bosnian-Serbian forces’ that started in 1992. And as 
if this were not vague enough, he takes us even further back to the death of ‘Marshall [sic] 
Tito’ in 1980. By now all focus is lost, and Polizzi has started a discussion without 
connection to anything that might have been the subject of my examination and argument. 
Polizzi appears to believe that by going into the deeper past by several decades of 
‘this current story’ (which actually dates from the last year of the previous century) he can 
more easily contest my claim that NATO committed aggression against Yugoslavia. 
Unfortunately for Polizzi’s attempt to provide the appearance of factual scholarship 
throughout his article he refers to then still non-existent country of Serbia. Perhaps even more 
inexplicable in the conclusion to his article he ridicules me for calling it Yugoslavia because, 
according to Polizzi, it could be seen as legitimate only from ‘a Serbian perspective to 
continue to embrace the name’. Yet, the historical record is unequivocal that ‘Yugoslavia’ 
was the name of the country in question in 1999, which became the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2003, and finally the Republic of Serbia only in 2006 when Montenegro 
seceded.  
For those who, like Polizzi, might find the view that NATO committed an aggression 
against Yugoslavia an idiosyncratic oddity, it is worth noting that it is not. Take for example 
a recent textbook on the ‘morality of war’ that states:  
 
The ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo turned what had been a brutal repression of a brutal 
upraising into a humanitarian catastrophe, and lead to the first massive bombing of a European country 
since World War II. At the same time, NATO transformed itself from a defensive alliance into the first 
proud aggressor in Europe since the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia 
in 1968.14 
 
Polizzi agrees with me that Yugoslavia did not attack or threaten any of the state members of 
NATO in 1999, but disagrees that NATO attack on Yugoslavia (he continues to think it was 
simply Serbia—though many targets in Montenegro, including schools, hospitals, and 
factories were also hit) was unprovoked. This distinction is hardly meaningful as it suggests 
that perhaps ‘provoked’ aggressions are obviously justified. In order to substantiate his view, 
Polizzi thinks he must present a history of the region that goes further back in the past. To 
make his case Polizzi relies on a single source, a recent Ph.D. dissertation with a parochial 
bent, the selection of which he never justifies, and which he fails to examine critically. This 
latter omission of Polizzi’s scholarship is significant because there are several serious 
scholarly concerns about the dissertation, as we shall examine later on.  
Even then, Polizzi’s ‘story’ of the history of Yugoslavia since 1980 is inaccurately 
told; he even fails to list the six socialist republics that used to make up SFRY by omitting to 
mention the republic of Croatia, and giving only half of the name for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
There is no necessity to go into all inaccuracies and mistakes in Polizzi’s retelling of the 
history of Yugoslavia since this is entirely irrelevant to the discussion at hand pertaining to 
the proper characterization of the US led NATO attack on Yugoslavia and the role Walzer, 
and his instrumentalization of the just war theory (in the guise of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’), played in facilitating the aggression and its ‘justification’ to the middlebrow 
non-academic general audience.  
                                                 
14 Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (eds), Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases (Lexington Books 
2008) 233 (emphasis added). 




It is surprising for anyone relying on a single source, to hold the epistemic attitude of 
certainty. It is simply shoddy scholarship to suggest that possession of a single source 
amounts to the possession of historical truth on Yugoslavia or much of anything for that 
matter. And, since I do not abide by Polizzi’s disclosed truth, or conventional wisdom, in 
Polizzi’s view, I must not be allowed to make my points unanswered. Polizzi’s response to 
my article attempts to reconstitute the Western ‘memory’ of what went on in the Balkans of 
the 1990’s. However, rather than show the mistakes I allegedly made, Polizzi exhibits a 
superficiality about the events of the historical record by simply appealing to what has 
become ‘conventional wisdom’ about those events in the West. Even though inconsequential 
for disputing my claims, it is important to point out some blunders in Polizzi’s tenuous 
historical narrative. 
Let us start by considering the merits of Polizzi’s preferred source on the history of 
the Yugoslav dissolution. If he really wanted an expert account of the events leading up to the 
NATO initiative in Yugoslavia in 1999, with the hope that this would aid him in portraying it 
as something other than NATO’s crime against peace, a natural thing would have been to 
consult the works of some established historians or scholars of the Balkans. There is no 
shortage of such experts.
15
 Instead, Polizzi consults no historian at all, but turns to a Croatian 
political scientist, Josip Glaurdić. This all-important source about Balkan history for Polizzi 
is simply a 2009 dissertation published as a book in 2011. One may wonder what Polizzi’s 
point is here, or what his strategy may be. We have already seen how Polizzi’s belief that I 
am a Serb has influenced his assessment of my position on NATO 1999 aggression against 
Yugoslavia. Is Polizzi’s strategy to counterbalance what I—an assumed Serb—had to say by 
offering a pro-Croatian source and representing it as a final word on the history of 
Yugoslavia? Be that as it may, this ‘methodology’ of ethno-reading of people’s research is of 
no interest to me. More importantly, however, from the perspective of scholarship is that 
Glaurdić’s work can be of no help to Polizzi because it is not a work of history at all. The 
work’s focus is not even the Balkans and the events there; rather, it is intended as an analysis 
of the policies of Western powers toward former Yugoslavia in the period between 1987 and 
1992. From a historiographical point of view any scholar who would consider personal 
interviews with former diplomats,
16
 the declassified and redacted documents of the CIA and 
the Foreign Office,
17
 and the evidence used at ICTY
18
 as sufficient sources for writing a 
                                                 
15 A reader would certainly be less surprised had Polizzi consulted one of the now classic works on Yugoslavia 
such as for example, Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After Cold War (Brookings 
Institution Press 1995), or Leonard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in 
transition (Westview Press 1995); or more recent edited volumes on this theme such as Charles Ingrao and 
Emmert Thomas Emmert A. (eds), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (US Institute 
of Peace Press; Purdue University Press 2009), or Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović (eds), State Collapse in 
South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Purdue University Press 2008); or 
excellent works that challenge the mainstream accounts of how Yugoslavia went out of existence, such as Diana 
Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato, and Western Delusions (Monthly Review Press 2003), or Kate 
Hudson, Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Pluto Press 2003). 
16Raul Hilberg, the foremost Holocaust scholar, left out personal testimony as a matter of principle in his 
momentous The Destruction of European Jewry (Yale UP 2003).  
17 Documents generated by intelligence outfits require great care, as most of their work is to produce and 
disseminate in targeted ways disinformation rather than anything that resembles historical facts. On the 
pervasive use of disinformation as a predominant task of intelligence services see, for example, Edward Jay 
Epstein, ‘Disinformation’ <http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/whokilled.htm> (accessed 4 April 
2013). 
18 To consider as historical facts the information generated at an ad hoc international tribunal of questionable 
legality—for it is established by the UN Security Council, in contradiction to its actual mandate, rather then an 
international treaty or a vote in the UN General Assembly—is to ignore the warning by the respected Canadian 
lawyer and academic David Paccioco: ‘history and justice cannot be written at the same time, and with the same 
pen, without distorting both’. David Paccioco, ‘Defending Rwandans Accused before the ICTR: A Venture Full 
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history of how a country went out of existence could appear as relying on rather meagre 
sources. 
To understand the extent of Polizzi’s error in reading Glaurdić so uncritically, let us 
contrast Glaurdić’s dissertation, taken by Polizzi as the final history of ‘the course of events 
that led up to the military response by NATO’ in 1999, to a decade long project by a 
committee of academics under the leadership of senior scholars in history, Charles Ingrao and 
Thomas Emmert, whose goal was to forge scholarly consensus about Yugoslavia's dissolution 
and the accompanying wars. The outcome of this group was rather different when it 
expanded to nearly 400 individuals from thirty countries among whom about 175 made 
substantive contributions to the project—but without Croatian scholars who refused to join 
with their Serb and other colleagues in the endeavour—published the result: Confronting the 
Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative.
19
 In the words of principal organizers:  
 
At no point in this decade-long project have we expected anything approaching universal acceptance of 
the volume’s findings—least of all in this first instalment in the process. Instead we have aimed at 
debunking myths and presenting ‘inconvenient facts’ to make everyone equally unhappy.20  
 
Rather than offer anything like the ‘final history’ the objective of this project was 
 
an attempt by historians and social scientists to challenge the tendentious nationalistic narratives.. by 
exposing and discrediting each belligerent's myths about the Yugoslav conflicts while simultaneously 
inserting indisputable but inconvenient facts known to their former adversaries.21 
 
Unlike Polizzi’s portrayal of his source as achieving historical accuracy based on 
factual evidence generated in judicial proceedings at ICTY,
22
 personal interviews, and access 
to some CIA documents, A Scholars’ Initiative emphasizes controversies and open questions 
while fostering proper methodology and established facts rather than partisan and parochial 
agendas. The contrast can be further explored, since as chance would have it the journal of 
East European Politics and Societies selected none other than Glaurdić to write a long review 
of A Scholars’ Initiative to which its editors have forcefully responded.23 First, let us consider 
Ingrao and Emmert’s astonishment that Glaurdić would be chosen to write a review of their 
volume:  
 
We are flattered that EEPS attaches sufficient importance to our edited volume, Confronting the 
Yugoslav Controversies, to commission an eight-thousand-word review—which is even longer than 
some of the journal’s full-length articles! Hence our amazement that EEPS would entrust a very junior 
scholar (PhD, Yale University, 2008) with such a task. Evidently the reviewer has friends in high 
places or, perhaps, there are scholars in high places who are counting on the reviewer to serve their 
agenda. Indeed, responding to his criticisms, several of our research team leaders echoed our own view 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Pitfalls and Lessons for the International Criminal Law’ in Hélène Dumont and Anne-Marie Boisvert (eds), 
La voie vers la Cour pénale internationale: tous les chemins mênent à Rome (Thémis 2004) 101. 
19 Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative 
(US Institute of Peace Press; Purdue University Press 2009). 
20 Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić's Review’ (2010) 24 East European 
Politics and Societies 310, 314-315. 
21Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative 
(US Institute of Peace Press; Purdue University Press 2009) 3. 
22 Hilberg warns that even Nuremberg trials cannot be taken as a source for writing history when he states that 
they ‘were conducted not so much to understand Germany’s history as to conclude unfinished business in order 
that Germany might be reconstructed with a clean slate in the North Atlantic community of nations confronted 
with the threat of communism’. Raul Hilberg The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian 
(Ivan R. Dee 1996) 69-70. The creation of ICTY/R may similarly be explained in terms of a political design for 
extinguishing in the post cold war period countries with viable and sustainable socialist economies. 
23 Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić 's Review’ (n 20) 314-315. 




that Dr. Glaurdić’s opus represents the views and encyclopedic knowledge of more than a single, junior 
scholar.24 
 
Readers may be surprised to see reference to Glaurdić as ‘a very junior scholar’ as 
this may appear as an obvious ad hominem, and even more surprised to see the phrase 
‘friends in high places’, which might strike them as unduly conspiratorial. But Ingrao and 
Emmert are pointing to a real phenomenon here. In fact, two important points from their 
comment should be made explicit: (i) rather than being really the effort of this ‘very junior 
scholar’ the review they suggest appears to have been a ‘work by committee’; and (ii) that the 
review exhibits an agenda pushed by ‘friends in high places’. To understand the first point 
one just has to be reminded of a phenomenon, recently made prominent during the last US 
attack on Iraq, of the so called ‘embedded journalism’ where select ‘reporters’ transmit 
information already prepared by Pentagon. These ‘journalists’ (actually, just force multipliers 
for the US campaign) are simple conduits of (dis)information that one belligerent party in a 
war wants to see widely disseminated. To understand the significance of something like 
Glaurdić’s work, think about academics cast in similar roles within campaigns on the 
forefront of ideological or other battles for the sake of some group or agenda.
25
 A good 
analysis of how democratic governments often exploit their citizens’ faith in the 
independence of the media to generate popular support for government policies can be found 
in a recent study by Mark Wolfgram.
26
 More specifically, and of particular interest for our 
discussion is that Wolfgram, using examples of Operation Horseshoe and the fighting at 
Racak and Rugovo during the Kosovo conflict of 1998 and 1999, illustrates how democratic 
governments in the US and Germany attempted to manipulate public perceptions of the 
Kosovo conflict to justify the 1999 war. The second point is in this case even easier to 
understand once we recognize that the editor of the East European Politics and Societies is 
Ivo Banac who happens to be not only a long time history professor at Yale, but also 
someone who has been very active in Croatian politics and public life.
27
 The ‘agenda pushed 
by friends in high places’ easily finds its exponents among willing academic climbers. Hence, 
Glaurdić merely appears, according to Ingrao and Emmert, to represent the view of Croatian 
senior scholars’ groupthink with their agenda. Ingrao and Emmert put it this way: ‘Now, the 
question is whether senior scholars whose views [Glaurdić] represents will finally accept our 
standing invitation to join with their Serb and other colleagues in strengthening the present 
edition. Or will they continue to stand on the sidelines, doing what they can to defeat the 
process?’28 
With friends in high places things much bigger than a well-placed book review or a 
pamphlet with clear agenda can happen. But, it is quite another thing to take such oeuvres as 
genuine scholarship (rather than simply as exhibiting ‘activism in scholarship’), and base 
one’s arguments against seriously undertaken research on such sources as Polizzi has done. 
                                                 
24 Ingrao and Emmert ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić's Review’ (n 20) 310. 
25 This is no novel phenomenon. Consider Congress for Cultural Freedom, lavishly funded by CIA through 
various front and real private foundations, along with ‘left’ magazines, journals, galleries, theatres, and public 
‘intellectuals’. Today this is so well known that the CIA's own Web site features an article about the agency’s 
involvement with anti-Communist groups in the Cold War. The article details this construction of the fake left, 
describing the ‘theoretical foundations of the Agency’s political operations against communism’ 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/95unclass/Warner.html last accessed October 29, 2012). For more, see Frances Saunders, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New Press 2000). 
26 Mark Wolfgram, ‘Democracy and Propaganda: NATO’s War in Kosovo’ (2008) 23 European Journal of 
Communication 153. 
27 Ivo Banac was a leader of Croatia's Liberal Party, a member of parliament, a cabinet minister, and, until 
recently, served as president of the Croatian Helsinki Committee funded by Human Rights Watch. 
28 Ingrao and Emmert ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić's Review’ (n 20) 315. 
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The attitude of ideological arrogance
29
 may be the best way of explaining the complacency 
with which a scholar could assert the allegedly ‘final accounts’ of the histories of far away 
places are in one’s own hands despite the methods for data collection and analysis being well 
beyond one’s own expertise. 
Another reason for my assertion that Polizzi has not chosen wisely when relying on 
Glaurdić to explain the destruction of Yugoslavia is that Polizzi wants to talk about ‘this 
genocide’ that allegedly took place in 1999 Yugoslavia (or as Polizzi insists, Serbia). 
Glaurdić cannot be a good guide on the issue of genocide since he does not, or does not want 
to, understand the legal definition of the term, and insists that ethnic cleansing
30
 is 
indistinguishable from genocide. As Ingrao and Emmert point out, in his criticisms of chapter 
4 of A Scholars’ Initiative, ‘Glaurdić insinuates that by differentiating between ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, the chapter authors denied the legitimacy of equating ethnic 
cleansing with genocide’.31 Then they rightly set the conceptual matters straight: ‘Glaurdić, in 
his apparent defense of a position that suggests that all ethnic cleansing is genocide, fails to 
understand and accept that distinction’.32 Glaurdić’s is a common gambit among those 
seeking to assign responsibility for genocide, the most stigmatizing of all crimes, on Serbs.  
Francis Boyle, who argued Bosnia’s claim against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), employed the same approach. This manoeuvre is 
clearly visible in the book The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis by John 
Quigley who is a scholar in the field of human rights and an activist. His book is a perfect 
example of ‘activism in scholarship’. He favours what is known as an expansive definition of 
the crime of genocide, and he campaigned for the enlargement of genocide's ‘narrow’ 
definition (that is, the one found in the Genocide Convention). What is characteristic of his 
expansive approach concerns the act known as ‘ethnic cleansing’? This ‘conceptual’ effort 
bent on redefining ‘genocide’ to absorb ‘ethnic cleansing’ fits well with his personal 
engagements, such as in 1990s being part of a team of lawyers who argued Bosnia's claim 
against FR Yugoslavia at ICJ. Without a gambit such as expanding the definition of genocide 
to include ethnic cleansing his client (the political entity of) the (Muslim and Croat) 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which refers to one of the two ‘entities’ that make up the 
country according to Dayton Accords, the other being Republika Srpska) stood no chance of 
winning the case in front of ICJ. Hence, in the book we find Quigley arguing in favour of the 
thesis that ethnic cleansing equals genocide, which in its final judgment in the Bosnia case 
the Court later fully dismissed. Similarly, Ingrao and Emmert rightly reject Glaurdić’s 
attempt:  
 
Not each and every single crime that happened in the context of ‘ethnic cleansing’ policy counts legally 
as genocide, and not each and every perpetrator counts legally as a ‘genocider.’ Crimes may also be 
classified as grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, violations of the customs of war, or crimes 
against humanity. This statement is not a mere conclusion of this research team but a simple empirical 
fact that emerges from the ICTY statuteas well as from its rulings, to which the team closely adhered in 
arriving at a consensus.33  
 
                                                 
29 For a detailed conceptual analysis of the ‘attitude of ideologically-based epistemic arrogance’ see Aleksandar 
Jokic ‘Genocidalism” (2004) 8 The Journal of Ethics 251, 258-59. 
30 The article by James Nickel, ‘Moral Dimensions of Four Ways of Getting Rid of Groups’ in Aleksandar Jokic 
(ed), War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing (Blackwell Publishers 2001) offers the best analysis of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and how it differs from genocide. 
31 Ingrao and Emmert ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić's Review’ (n 18) 311. 
32 Ibid. 312. 
33 Ibid. 




Unfortunately, something being conceptually a bad move will not stop people from 
trying it when they have an agenda (or a paying client). This is the ‘genocide or nothing’ 
attitude, as what is sought is the maximum stigmatization of one’s enemy. The complaint 
Bosnian Muslims were not interested in pursuing was that ‘crimes against humanity’ may 
have taken place in those instances labelled as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (not stigmatizing enough). 
They would rather lose their case at the ICJ claiming genocide than recognize that the acts 
that took place in the context of ‘ethnic cleansing’ are not necessarily genocide. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, in his brief historical narrative based on his deeply 
compromised source, Polizzi repeats some long falsified or suspect claims from the period of 
high Western ‘media hype’ or conventional wisdom about the Balkans.34 I will discuss just 
three of them: (1) claims about concentration camps in Bosnia; (2) the narrative about 
Srebrenica massacre; and (3) the genocide discourse about Kosovo. 
 
1. Claims about Concentration Camps In Bosnia 
 
In his story of ‘how it all began’ that somehow should absolve NATO of its crime 
against peace when it attacked Yugoslavia from the air in 1999, Polizzi writes: ‘The United 
Nations in 1992 responded with imposed economic sanctions and peacekeeping forces as an 
answer to numerous documented reported atrocities, the shelling of the Bosnian city of 
Sarajevo and the construction of concentration camps in an attempt to stop the killing’.35 
Apparently, Polizzi believes that concentration camps were constructed in 1992 Bosnia. This 
conjures up images of WWII Europe under German occupation where in 
Konzentrationslagern slave-labourers from across Europe, in the first instance the (socialist 
and communist) political opponents of the Nazi, then increasingly Jews (slated for eventual 
wholesale destruction), criminals, homosexuals, Roma, the mentally ill and others were 
incarcerated for the most part without any judicial process. Their treatment was horrible; 
prisoners died from deliberate maltreatment, disease, starvation, and overwork, or were 
executed as unfit for labour. Why would anyone think such places existed in 1992 Bosnia?  
It is all thanks to one TV report, one video, and in particular one picture. Here’s one 
description of how it all happened: 
 
I have seen the out-takes of the ITN report on Trnopolje and film taken by what I am told is a Serbian 
cameraman and have analysed them both. Penny Marshall is seen and heard making every effort to 
discover what Trnopolje is. She asks several times: ‘What is this place?’ The person being questioned 
responds in Serbo-Croat but the translation seems unsatisfactory because she repeats the question. 
Meantime the ITN camera is wandering around the scene looking for an image that will illustrate 
whatever the real answer to Marshall's question turns out to be. It homes in on a handgun worn by one 
of the Serb soldiers conducting the ITN party. But armed men are everywhere. It wanders across the 
ground to building then up to the first-floor windows of the building. They are barred. It lingers on the 
bars. But the bars might well be to stop people falling out, rather than to confine them. Then the camera 
shows Marshall walking across some ground towards some barbed wire. This is not a serious barbed 
wire fence. Compare it, for example with the barbed wire fences seen in countless images of Nazi death 
and concentration camps. This one looks more agricultural, intended to confine animals rather than 
people. But suddenly, at the other side of that barbed wire is a painfully thin man, ribs prominent. The 
camera zooms in on the man and the strand of barbed wire. The two together provide an image that 
spells out immediately Nazis, Jews, death camps, World War 2. No amount of qualification in the 
spoken report could overcome the power of this image. That's the way television war reporting works.36 
                                                 
34 Among the best analyses of this Western media hype is certainly chapter two of Diane Jonstone, Fools' 
Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions (Monthly Review Press 2003). 
35 David Polizzi, ‘Just War, Genocide, or Necessity: A Critical Response to Jokic’ (n 2) 117. 
36 The quoted text is from a personal communication with Knightley, while his entire testimony is published 
online at the bottom of the following page:< http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/11/05/storm-over-brockes-
fakery/> (last accessed 2 March 2013). 
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This is a testimony in a British court by the famed war reporter and professor of journalism, 
Phillip Knightley, author of the celebrated book on war propaganda, The First Casualty. Why 
was Knightley offering testimony in court about this infamous image out of Bosnia in 1992? 
As Knightley himself explains:  
 
ITN had sued for defamation the magazine Living Marxism, which had published evidence discovered 
by a German freelance journalist Thomas Deichmann that the world was fooled. Deichmann asserted 
that the barbed wire, an essential element of ITN's image, was not intended to confine the Muslims but 
to protect a pre-war agricultural compound. Penny Marshall and her cameraman, Jeremy Irvin, had 
inadvertently entered this compound, so that if anyone was behind barbed wire, it was them the TV 
crew. Further, the camp was a collection centre for refugees and many Bosnians had come there 
voluntarily to seek safety and could leave if they wished. 
 
Hence, from the claims of concentration camp we get to not even detention camp, but just a 
collection camp for refugees. But how is it possible then that smart people in the West, who 
believe themselves informed about ‘atrocities’ in former Yugoslavia and about who did what 
to whom, still live under the spell of the initial picture, the initial interpretation and myth long 
since debunked? The answer in part comes from the crucial role played by the public 
relations firms, agents for the interests of foreign nations and groups, whose intent is 
spreading the ‘news’ favourable to their clients. There is no better document explaining this 
modus operandi than the interview by Jacques Merlino (Deputy Director of the network 
France 2, Paris) with James Harff (Director of Rider Finn’s Global Public Affairs Section) 
who represented the interests of Bosnian Muslims in the US: 
 
HARFF: The great majority of Americans were probably asking themselves in which African country 
Bosnia was situated. But, by a single move, we were able to present a simple story of good guys and 
bad guys, which would hereafter play itself. We won by targeting the Jewish audience, the right target. 
Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high 
emotional content, such as ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘concentration camps’, etc. which evoked inmates of 
Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional change was so powerful that nobody 
could go against it… 
MERLINO: But when you did all this, between 2 and 5 of August 1992, you had no proof that what 
you said was true. You only had two articles in Newsday. 
HARFF: Our work is not to verify information. We are not equipped for that. Our work is to accelerate 
the circulation of information favourable to us, to aim them at carefully chosen targets. We did not 
claim that there were death camps in Bosnia we just made it known that Newsday claimed it. 
MERLINO: Are you aware that you took on a grave responsibility? 
HARFF: We are professionals. We had a job to do and we did it. We are not paid to moralize. And 
when the time comes to start a debate on all of this, we have a clear conscience. For, if you wish to 
prove that Serbs are in fact poor victims, go ahead, but you will be quite alone.37 
 
Because of the ‘clear conscience’ of ‘professionals’ like Harff, people like Polizzi still 
to this day believe that there were concentration camps (and why not death camps?) in 1992 
Bosnia. By simply repeating exaggerated claims of (embedded) journalists (such as Marlise 
Simons and Ed Vulliamy) and agenda-pushing scholars (like Glaurdić) while at the same 
time never showing any awareness of the existing compelling contrary evidence presented by 
both other journalists and other scholars, Polizzi necessarily treads at the level of 
superficiality and fails the test of serious, rigorous factually based scholarship. Compare 
Polizzi’s approach with that of A Scholars’ Initiative: ‘[the] quest for an objective narrative 
through honest dialogue that lies at the heart of the process in which we have been engaged 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
37 From Jacques Merlino, Les Vérités Yugoslaves ne sont pas toutes bonnes à dire (Albin Michel, 1993); English 
translation available at http://www.nationalism.org/sf/Articles/a122.html (last accessed 12 March 2013). 




over the past decade.’ Honesty is the first step towards serious scholarship, methodology 
notwithstanding.  
 
2. The Narrative about Srebrenica Massacre 
 
Continuing his historical narrative Polizzi avers: ‘However, peacekeeping forces had 
little effect on the continued violence and were unable to prevent the infamous killings in 
Srebrenica in 1995, which claimed the lives of approximately 8000 unarmed men and boys 
killed over several days in what was portrayed as an act of vengeance for Serbian deaths at 
the hands of Muslims; a historic animosity that dates back to the Ottoman Empire’.38 The last 
point, often repeated in the West, about ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ as somehow accounting for 
the eruption of violence in 1990s Bosnia can be quickly dispelled. The simple, well known 
facts undermine Polizzi’s scholarship: paying attention to the geography of violence we see 
that the most brutal episodes during the process of destruction of Yugoslavia occurred almost 
entirely within regions that were the most ‘mixed’—in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
which the various nations of Yugoslavia were most intermingled. While from 1953 to 1981 
most of the territories of Yugoslavia became increasingly heterogeneous,
39
 which was shown 
in an increase in the rates of intermarriage between members of the different national groups, 
‘but were particularly common between Serbs and Croats, and between Serbs and Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’.40 And, not surprisingly, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina had the highest 
percentage of ‘mixed’ children—15.9 per cent overall—also concentrated in the most mixed 
areas’.41 Who were these people, then, who both hated each other and intermarried to such a 
degree, and had children together? Before turning to answer that question, there is something 
more important behind the myth about ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ to consider, and it has to do 
with the approved Western answer to the question ‘How did Yugoslavia cease to exist?’ In 
my ‘Introduction’ to the special issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law on 
‘Yugoslavia Dismantled and International Law’ I rendered it in the following way: 
 
…on the question of ‘What happened to Yugoslavia?’ we can discern two broad categories of answers. 
In the ever growing, generally unanimous, and quite repetitive literature (including endlessly recurring 
pronouncements by politicians or activists) on this question, the dominant view in the West, without a 
doubt, is that Yugoslavia fell apart once various internal contradictions could no longer be kept under 
control. Call this ‘the self-destruction of Yugoslavia’ account of how it all played out. The competing 
account which offers to explain how the state of Yugoslavia ceased to exist focuses on the emergence, 
in the post Cold War period, of the agency of a single, unchallenged superpower: the United States of 
America. Call this ‘the Hegemon did it’ account of how Yugoslavia was dismantled.42 
 
                                                 
38 David Polizzi, ‘Just War, Genocide, or Necessity: A Critical Response to Jokic’ (n 2) 115, 117. 
39 Ruža Petrović, Migracije u Jugoslaviji i Etnicki Aspekt (Belgrade, SSO Srbije 1987) 48. 
40 Robert M. Hayden, ‘Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in 
Yugoslavia’ (1996) American Ethnologist 23(4) 783, 788. Hayden shows, using the statistics provided by the 
leading Yugoslav sociologist, Ruža Petrović, that ethnic intermingling in terms of coresidence and intermarriage 
was substantial before 1990 and was increasing, and he contests, rightly in my mind, the contrary conclusions of 
Nikolai Botev and Richard Wagner, ‘Seeing Past the Barricades: Ethnic Intermarriage in Yugoslavia During the 
Last Three Decades’ (1983) Anthropology of East Europe Review 11, 27. (This point was also recognized in 
E.A. Hammel, ‘Lessons from the Yugoslav Labyrinth’ in Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, Neighbors at 
War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and history (The Pennsylvania State 
University 2000), 24.)  
41 Ibid. 789. 
42 Aleksandar Jokic, ‘Yugoslavia Dismantled and International Law’ (2006) 19 International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law 339, 339-40. 
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Yugoslavia did not self-destruct.43 Reliable sources indicate that Yugoslavia was 
dismantled by decisive influences from the outside world, in particular the US. Crucial in this 
process was the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513 that Congress passed 
on November 5, 1990 a year before the break up of Yugoslavia. Citing particularly lethal 
provisions of this law, a CIA report, described three weeks later in the 28 November 1990 
New York Times,44 predicted it would lead to a bloody civil war in Yugoslavia. The law cut 
off all aid, trade, credits and loans from the US to Yugoslavia within six months. It demanded 
separate elections in each of the six republics that made up Yugoslavia, requiring State 
Department approval of election procedures and results before aid to the separate republics 
would be resumed. It also required US personnel in all international financial institutions like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to enforce this cut-off policy for all 
credits and loans. Additionally, it allowed only for forces that the US State Department 
defined as ‘democratic forces’ to receive funding. This meant that only small right-wing 
nationalist parties were funded in the midst of a sudden financial crisis engineered as the 
consequence of this bill. The impact was, as expected, completely devastating.45 
Thus the political ideologies—extreme nationalism, particularly in secessionist 
republics—that won the free elections of 1990 were a result of these combined external 
influences. However, those newly constituted nationalist ideologies aiming to construct 
homogenous nation-states, and invoking allegedly ‘primordial’ communities, stood in sharp 
contrast to the actual, living cultures in the existing heterogeneous communities, as shown 
two paragraphs above. Hence, the wars of the Yugoslav secessions and successions were not 
a result of ‘ancient ethic hatred’,46 but, exactly to the contrary, merely a necessary tool—
conceived outside the country—for un-mixing the well integrated communities. In less 
heterogeneous areas this un-mixing often could be achieved without violence, using 
bureaucratic means. Resorting to physical violence, however, occurs where cultural 
geography is most heterogeneous, thus the carnage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We may even 
contemplate to postulate the following anthropological principle: The more an area is mixed, 
the more drastic a measure is necessary to bring about homogenization of the community (in 
                                                 
43 Jasna Dragović-Soso distinguishes five categories of explanation of why Yugoslavia disintegrated, but her 
first four are just versions of my first category, which I reject:  
 
1. Explanations focused on the longue durée, emphasizing ‘ancient hatreds’, a ‘clash of 
civilizations’, or the legacy of imperial rule in the Balkans 
2. Explanations focused on the historical legacy of the nineteenth-century South Slav national 
ideologies and the first Yugoslavia state-building experiment from 1918 to 1941 
3. Explanations focused on the legacy of Yugoslavia’s socialist system, its constitutional 
development and federal structure, its ideological delegitimation, and its economic failure 
4. Explanations focused on the period of Yugoslavia’s breakdown in the second half of the 1980s 
and the role of political and intellectual agency 
5. Explanations focused on the impact of external factors. 
 
Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations’ in 
Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso, State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on 
Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Purdue UP 2008) 2. 
44 David Binder, ‘Yugoslavia Seen Breaking up Soon: C.I.A. Paper Predicts Action in 18 Months and Adds 
Civil War Likely’ New York Times (New York, 28 November 1990) 7. 
45 See the paragraph on Yugoslavia in The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1991, Public Law 101-513, appropriated funds for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1991. (<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c101:1:./temp/~c101yOzOZS:e274712> last accessed 3 April 
2013). 
46 Robert Hayden writes correctly that ‘the idea that the Yugoslav peoples could not live peacefully together was 
empirical nonsense’. Robert M. Hayden, ‘Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and 
Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia’ (1996) American Ethnologist 23(4) 783, 790. 




the form of political sovereignty of a given group enjoying overwhelming majority in the 
area).  
To return to the narrative about Srebrenica massacre, it has played a special role in the 
politics of West’s restructuring of the former Yugoslavia and in Western interventionism 
more broadly. Edward Herman captures this eloquently: 
 
There are three matters that should have raised serious questions about the Srebrenica massacre itself at 
the time and since, but didn’t and haven’t. One was that the massacre was extremely convenient to the 
political needs of the Clinton administration, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Croats. A second was that 
there had been (and were after Srebrenica) a series of claimed Serb atrocities, that were regularly 
brought forth at strategic moments when forcible intervention by the United States and NATO bloc was 
in the offing but needed some solid public relations support, but which were later shown to be 
fraudulent. A third is that the evidence for a massacre, certainly of one in which 8000 men and boys 
were executed, has always been problematic, to say the least.47 
 
Indeed, the formulation ‘8000 unarmed men and boys killed’ is extremely problematic and 
less frequent lately. It is more common to say ‘8000 unarmed men and boys killed or 
missing’. The problem is that men were certainly armed while women, children, and elderly 
were evacuated from the danger zone that Srebrenica was after the fall to Serbian forces to 
the Bosnian Muslim held territory. In contrast to Polizzi, the ICTY indictment of General 
Ratko Mladić, who is primarily blamed for Srebrenica killings, speaks of ‘Over 7,000 
Bosnian Muslim prisoners captured in the area around Srebrenica [who] were summarily 
executed’.48 However, what Polizzi’s formulation obscures is the fact that Srebrenica was not 
a demilitarized ‘safe haven’ but an enclave under control of the brutal warlord Naser Orić, 
commander of the 28th Division of the Bosnian Army, whose well armed men (an entire 
army corps with artillery) committed numerous massacres in nearby Serb villages, and this 
according to the sworn testimony at the ICTY of the French general Philip Morillion who 
was even held hostage in Srebrenica by Orić at the orders from Sarajevo. Hence, those killed 
‘in the woods around Srebrenica’ were not ‘unarmed Bosnian Muslim men and boys’ as 
Polizzi and others (following conventional wisdom) write, but members of the Bosnian Army 
who received the order from Sarajevo to abandon Srebrenica and try to make it (with their 
arms) to the Muslim held territory. It is another matter that the ICTY, stretching the definition 
to absurdity, and relying to a novel legal concept, in Krstić case, called Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE), discussed in detail by Dickson and Jokic,
49
 declared the deaths of those 
Muslim combatants that didn't survive the trek (though many did) to be ‘genocide’. All the 
while Mladić supervised an orderly evacuation of Muslim civilians from Srebrenica. Thus, 
the usual lament about the shame of Dutch UN troops who were allegedly outnumbered and 
outgunned by Mladić’s forces surrendered Srebrenica to its fate also misses the point. What 
were the Dutch supposed to do: offer personal escort to each armed Muslim combatant who 
instead of defending Srebrenica, which would have been very easy because of its 
geographical position, followed the order to make a break from the town? And what were the 
                                                 
47 Edward Herman, ‘The Approved Narrative of the Srebrenica Massacre’ (2006) 19 International Journal for 
the Semiotics of Law 409, 411. 
48Prosecutor v Mladić (Amended Indictment) ICTY IT-95-5/18-I (10 October 2002). 
49 The main point being that JCE ‘as it is presently framed by the ICTY, is both a very recent and unique legal 
concept. As such, it is contrary to the principle of legality and is without legal authority. Its purpose is to 
facilitate convictions before the institution, as it significantly reduces the prosecutorial burden of proof, and 
permits the conviction of the morally–and objectively–innocent. JCE is only necessary for cases where there is, 
in fact, no evidence – or insufficient evidence, from the standpoint of the criminal burden of proof–of genocidal 
intent. In other words, its purpose can be said to be to convict the innocent’. Tiphaine Dickson and Aleksandar 
Jokic, ‘Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Unsightly Milosevic Case’ (2006) 19 International 
Journal for the Semiotics of Law 355, 370-72. 
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Bosnian Serb forces supposed to do about armed Muslim combatants running out of 
Srebrenica: let those Muslim soldiers reinforce the troops on the Muslim held territory to 
fight them again, even though many of them could be presumed responsible for killing 
thousands of Serb civilians in the villages around Srebrenica?  
This last point is denied by Polizzi’s historical source on the lead up to NATO’s 
military involvement in Yugoslavia. Glaurdić in his criticism of A Scholars’ Initiative 
objected that the authors and editors failed to mention the appeal judgment in favour of Naser 
Orić in July 2008, and asserts that the judgment demonstrates that crimes against Serbs in the 
area of Srebrenica never happened. In response Ingrao and Emmert show Glaurdić’s selective 
use of the evidence presented at ICTY to push his agenda (or what they call ‘his friends in 
high places’) pointing out that ‘in its concluding remarks the Appeals Chamber noted that it: 
 
would like to underscore that, like the Trial Chamber, it has no doubt that grave crimes were committed 
against Serbs detained in Srebrenica at the Srebrenica Police Station and the Building between 
September 1992 and March 1993. Also the Defense did not challenge that crimes were committed 
against Serb detainees. However, proof that crimes have occurred is not sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of an individual for these crimes.50  
 
Yet again, now considering Polizzi’s second claim, we come to the issue of ethics and 
methodology in scholarship. Proper scholarly practice in the case of something as complex 
and (geo)politically loaded as the approved Western narrative about Srebrenica would at the 
minimum require that attention be also given to the fact that controversies exist and that 
meticulously researched scholarship, such as Edward Herman who argued that ‘The 
‘‘Srebrenica massacre’’ is the greatest triumph of propaganda to emerge from the Balkan 
wars’51, is available substantiating claims quite different from the emerged conventional 
wisdom.  
That there is something wrong regarding conventional wisdom about ‘Srebrenica’, in 
particular the claim that ‘8000 men and boys were executed’ can be further corroborated by 
looking at the curious way the ICTY has handled the forensic evidence. Specifically, we find 
surprisingly speculative claims about what the material evidence in fact shows and a total 
refusal to disclose the DNA evidence to the defence in order to have it examined by 
independent experts. As we shall see, these actions suggest that in all likelihood the probative 
value of the actual DNA evidence regarding ‘Srebrenica’ is not as argued: individual matches 
with surviving family members may have been definitively disproven, as in at least one ICTR 
case,
52
 or it may be that we are dealing with a smaller sample than expected. Either reason is 
deeply troubling. It is hard to imagine a better explanatory hypothesis of this peculiar practice 
at the ICTY. 
We can start our story of ‘the number of Srebrenica deaths’ at the ICTY by looking at 
the ‘Judgment’ in Prosecutor v Krstić where with respect to the forensic evidence we can 
read the following statement: ‘It is impossible to determine with precision the number of 
Bosnian Muslim men killed by Bosnian Serb forces following the take-over of Srebrenica in 
July 1995.’53 If this is impossible why was Krstić then found guilty of no less than genocide, 
and sentenced to 45 years of imprisonment? The text of the ‘Judgment’ gives a curiously 
aspirational character to the absence of forensic evidence in this case, which became evidence 
from the future, so to speak:  
 
                                                 
50 Ingrao and Emmert ‘Response to Josip Glaurdić's Review’ (n 18) 313. The authors give as their reference 
<http://www.icty.org/sid/9941>. 
51 Edward Herman, ‘The Approved Narrative of the Srebrenica Massacre’ (n 39) 409, 431. 
52Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment)ICTR 96-3-T (6 December 1999). 
53Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) ICTY IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 80. 




During the course of the exhumations conducted by the OTP, the process of identifying the number of 
bodies was complicated by the fact that, in the course of being removed from primary gravesites to 
secondary gravesites, the corpses were broken up and body parts became intermingled. However, as 
already noted, experts were able to conservatively determine that the minimum number of bodies in the 
graves exhumed was 2028. Although the Trial Chamber cannot dismiss the possibility that some of the 
exhumed bodies were killed in combat, it accepts that the majority of the victims were executed. 
Eighteen additional graves linked with Srebrenica have been located but not yet exhumed. Based on 
preliminary examinations conducted by the OTP, all of these sites contain human remains and it is 
expected that the total number of bodies found and linked with Srebrenica will significantly increase as 
these sites are exhumed.54 
 
Careful reading of this text tells us that (i) the material evidence was mishandled; (ii) the 
minimum number of exhumed bodies is merely an estimate (2028); (iii) how many among 
them were killed in combat rather than executed cannot be known; but (iv) the future forensic 
examinations ‘is expected’ to increase the number of bodies; which (v) again cannot be 
distinguished with respect to the cause of death (killed in combat or executed). 
This was the situation as described in Krstić, but perhaps some progress was made at 
the ICTY since. Was the enthusiasm about ‘future’ exhumations justified? Instead of 8,000 
bodies with wounds indicating that execution was the cause of death, as mandated by the key 
element of ‘conventional wisdom’, the forensic team of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
managed to assemble autopsy reports in only 3,568 ‘cases’. Practically half of those ‘cases’ 
fail to represent specific executed individuals, but consist of a few bones of persons whose 
cause of death was impossible to ascertain.
55
 However, analysing the number of femora 
present in all mass graves it was established that: the total number of the exhumed persons 
stood at 1,920; that the patterns of the wounds they had suffered were quite diverse; and that 
in several hundred cases those wound patterns were consistent with injuries received in 
combat, thus incompatible with the assumed (and accepted in advance) hypothesis of 
execution as the cause of death in all these cases (and more to come). What to do then about 
the claim of 7000 to 8000 executed victims, since in the absence of evidence for this claim 
the narrative about ‘Srebrenica genocide’ loses substantial credibility? 
In 2001 the OTP forensic experts abandoned their investigations in Bosnia. Their 
place was taken by two organizations: the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(MPI BiH) and the quasi-NGO
56
 International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) with 
its main laboratory in Tuzla. The ICMP was established at the initiative of the US President 
Clinton and is funded primarily by the US and UK governments (as well as some private 
foundations), and is always chaired by an American official appointed by the US Department 
of State.
57
 The new approach to forensic investigation regarding the Srebrenica deaths, under 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 See ‘Summary’ in Stefan Karaganović and Ljubisa Simić, Srebrenica: The Deconstruction of Virtual 
Genocide (NGO Srebrenica, The Netherlands 2011) 148. Available online at: http://www.srebrenica-
project.com/DOWNLOAD/books/Dekonstrukcija_2_izdanje.pdf (accessed 5 May 2013). 
56 The term ‘quasi non-governmental organization’ or ‘Quango’ indicates a government created and funded 
organization, thus held accountable to the government, but outside the civil service and thus said to enjoy 
operational independence. 
57 The press statement announcing Secretary Powell’s appointment of Jim Kimsey as the new chairperson of the 
ICMP is available in the archives of the US Department of State available online (11 May 2001) 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/un-shut-down-rwanda-probe/2007/02/09/1170524298428.html> 
(accessed 28 March 2013). The announcement of the appointment of the current chairperson of the ICMP, 
Ambassador Thomas Miller, is available on its web site. While this announcement is written in the form of 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton welcoming this appointment no account is given of who made this 
appointment: <http://www.ic-mp.org/press-releases/ambassador-thomas-miller-appointed-new-chairman-of-the-
international-commission-on-missing-personsambasador-thomas-miller-imenovan-za-novog-predsjedavajuceg-
medunarodne-komisije-za-nestale-osobe-icmp/> (accessed 28 March 2013). 
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exclusive control of these two organizations, has been an effort to find DNA matches 
between still unexamined human remains, exhumed predominately within the line of 
extraction of the 28
th
 division of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) from Srebrenica 
towards Tuzla in July 1995, and DNA samples submitted by relatives of the persons declared 
missing immediately after 11 July 1995. This strategy, it ought to be clear, cannot be useful 
for establishing the main tenet of the Srebrenica narrative that some 7000 to 8000 individuals 
were summarily executed in an act of genocide, since even if matches are established in these 
cases, and this is done in the most impeccable scientific way, this does not tell us anything 
about the time and manner of death of those individuals.
58
 Additionally, given the role the US 
has played in dismantling Yugoslavia, one can be forgiven for harbouring some suspicion 
with respect to the claimed independence and neutrality of an organization like the ICMP, 
always chaired by an official of the US Department of State. Such a body is vulnerable to 
accusations of political agendas and so needs its operations to be as transparent and open as 
possible. This operational practice, however, has not been the case. 
No defendant at ICTY, not even in such a high profile case as Prosecutor v Karadžić, 
has been able to insist that defence forensic experts, carry out an independent verification of 
the said DNA identification results. For the last three years the defence team of Radovan 
Karadžić has been unsuccessful in obtaining from the OTP the biological samples in order for 
them to be examined in an independent laboratory. This procedural failure has occurred 
despite the fact that the ICTY does contain ‘a somewhat sophisticated disclosure regime’,59 
and, for example, the Rule 66 (B) mandates that the Prosecutor ‘shall, on request, permit the 
defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects’ that ‘are 
intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial’.60 The defence team, however, does 
not even contemplate attempting to rely on this rule—no matter how painfully obvious this 
path might seem—in its effort to obtain disclosure of the DNA evidence in this case. For, 
already in 2008 the defence team in the case Prosecutor v Popović had tried this and was 
soundly rejected. The reason is utterly fascinating. Namely, ‘the Material’, which refers to the 
‘raw data’ that would permit an independent verification or counter-expertise of the DNA 
identification results performed by ICMP, ‘is not in the Prosecution’s “custody or control”’ 
but ‘a third party independent from the Prosecution’ has the data (which is the ICMP).61 Thus 
we learn the curious fact that the DNA material—the biological samples that the ICMP 
allegedly successfully matched in its laboratory in Tuzla—the Prosecution adduces in 
presenting its case is not in the Prosecution’s custody or control (but it is located in ICMP 
headquarters in Tuzla). All of this then means that in place of verifiable DNA samples the 
Prosecution is offering to the Trial Chamber and defence only the electropherograms of the 
alleged results. Obviously those pieces of paper can be of little or no value to the defence and 
its experts and can only be properly considered secondary sources. 
At this point readers familiar with the conception of fair trials in terms of the well-
known international principle of the ‘equality of arms’ and its corollary disclosure rules—
which aim at allowing the defence the same level of access to information as the 
                                                 
58 To remind the court, among other things, of this sort of limitation of DNA evidence is the task of the defence 
experts. But more generally: ‘Even, when the probative value of DNA evidence seems to be very high, it is still 
necessary to have it examined by a DNA expert who may be able to identify week points or even faults in 
methodology or statistical approaches used by prosecution scientists for evaluation of DNA evidence’. Andrei 
Semikhodskii, Dealing With DNA Evidence: A Legal Guide (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 128. 
59 See Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (OUP 2012) 351. 
60ICTY Rules of Procedures and Evidence 
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev45_en.pdf> (accessed 1 
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61Prosecutor v Popović (Decision On Popovic's Motion For Disclosure Pursuant To Rule 66 (B) And Request 
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Prosecutor—may wonder if any defendant at the ad hoc tribunals can in fact have a fair trial. 
Normally, given the right of the accused to a fair trial the prosecutor should disclose to the 
accused in advance of the trial the nature of the allegation against him (or her) and all the 
evidence on which the prosecution is to rely to secure conviction. This evidence includes 
DNA evidence. However, people interested in international criminal law should not expect 
this kind of fairness from international tribunals in general. Indeed, many scholars and 
practitioners, especially the German defence lawyers, heavily criticized the IMT in 
Nuremberg, as a mockery regarding equality of arms, as disclosure was woefully inadequate.  
Yet, the Nuremberg trials could be assessed positively in an important way. The best 
characterization we owe, I think, to Tiphaine Dickson’s interpretation of Judith Shklar who 
saw Nuremberg as a ‘law-like political institution’62 which  
 
should be seen as the political conclusion of a kind of politics (Nazism and fascism) and of a kind of 
war (World War II). Viewed in that light, Nuremberg could never stand as a precedent (legal or 
otherwise) but as a sui generis resolution of an ideological war of elimination—on both sides—which 
demanded the corresponding elimination (albeit by legal, or at least legalistic means) of its defeated 
leadership.63  
 
Clearly, however, while we can, following Shklar and Dickson, interpret the nature of ICTY 
and ICTR as ‘law-like political institutions’, we cannot see what is going on there as 
(political sui generis) ways to end indecent politics (such as were the eliminationist Nazism 
and fascism) as the states of Yugoslavia and Rwanda (at the time of their destruction) were 
developing, self-sustainable, socialist states organized on the principles of equality and 
humanity.  
Whatever the final judgment regarding the issue of fairness at current ad hoc 
tribunals, my reason for addressing the practice at the ICTY regarding disclosure of DNA 
evidence was different: to show that the probative value of this evidence regarding the key 
question about the number of Srebrenica deaths is non-existent since it cannot be challenged 
in an adversary proceeding. The main tenet of the ‘Srebrenica narrative’ then persists not 
because of the factual evidence but on the basis of the Prosecutor’s inability or unwillingness 
to cause a third party to make the key evidence available to independent examination by any 
defence experts. 
Finally, I must emphasize that nothing that was said here about these events is 
intended to be understood as disputing all the facts of the event referred to as the ‘Srebrenica 
massacre’. Instead, the preceding argumentation is offered as a way of putting into question 
or inviting scrutiny on, the legal characterization based on the findings of the ICTY. In 
addition I am arguing that elements of the ‘conventional wisdom’ on Bosnia (including 
Srebrenica) that have been put in question by some, including American scholars and North 
American lawyers, such as the numbers of victims, and the presence in Srebrenica of the 
armed Muslim forces who had committed massive killings in the surrounding areas, and who 
ran away rather than defend the town can and should be put into question. My point here is 
that once various elements of the ‘official’ view have been questioned on the basis of facts, it 
becomes methodologically and morally objectionable to engage in polemics on the basis of 
the disproved conventional wisdom, and particularly so without any mention that other views 
and arguments exist. The corollary argument is that the judicial forum is an imperfect vehicle, 
even in the best domestic circumstances, to build historical knowledge. 
 
3. The Genocide Discourse about Kosovo 
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As a transition to his discourse about genocide in Kosovo, Polizzi makes the 
following casual assertion about casualties in Bosnia: ‘By the time of the US led military 
intervention against Serbia and its Bosnian allies, well over a 100, 000 Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats had already lost their lives to the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing’.64 No 
reference is offered for this number and no indication is given in order to help us estimate 
what could be the number that the phrase ‘well over’ stands for while the implication is that 
either there were no Serb casualties at all or perhaps Serb deaths do not matter in Polizzi’s 
framework. In fact, the latest ICTY estimate of war related deaths on all sides (including Serb 
casualties) in Bosnia stands at 102,662 according to the tribunal’s own experts, Ewa Tabeau 
and Jakub Bijak.
65
 Of these 102,622 deaths that include casualties from all three warring 
sides some 55,261 were civilians and 47,360 military at the time of death.
66
 
Polizzi introduces his genocide discourse about Kosovo thus:  
 
The image of those buildings destroyed by NATO aerial attacks, to which the author eludes (sic) 
becomes for him proof of Serbian victimization; but they also become the image for those who see 
those same buildings as a type of vindication and as a symbol of defiance to an act of genocide.67 
 
What act of genocide would that be? Apparently a genocide the Yugoslav forces would have 
committed in the province of Kosovo is being referred to here. However, no description is 
attempted of this ‘act of genocide’, but instead reference is made to the previous times and 
events in Bosnia and Croatia, and Serbian civilian and military leaders are blamed for 
everything including the fact that NATO had to intervene, which leads Polizzi to put the 
following question directly to me:  
 
It is also somewhat puzzling that Jokic is more determined in his condemnation of Walzer and his 
application of just war theory as it related to the Balkans than he is of Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milosević, and his Bosnian-Serb allies Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladić for the course of events 
that led to NATO’s military involvement in the former Yugoslavia. … It is equally, true, however, that 
the Serbian people no doubt also directly suffered due to the realities of this war in both Kosovo and 
Croatia; but again, is this Walzer’s fault, is it NATO’s fault or is it the fault of those Serbian leaders 
who helped make the conditions for the broadening of this war possible?68 
 
It seems to me that by posing this question Polizzi’s scholarship declines even further. The 
portrayal of NATO as some sort of natural force governed by laws of nature given the events 
on the ground (leaving it no option but to intervene) rather than an institution with agency, 
and hence with responsibility for its actions, while perhaps widespread, wholly lacks 
credibility and is cheaply exculpatory.  
It would be a rather long discussion to address what actually happened in Kosovo in 
the run up to the US-led NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, but Polizzi’s claims 
can be dismissed rather easily by following the methodology (implicitly endorsed by Polizzi) 
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championed by his own source, Glaurdić, who takes the evidence used at ICTY as legitimate 
material to built a historical narrative about these events. Namely, no member of Yugoslav 
political or military leadership has ever been charged (not even using JCE, the legal novelty 
at this tribunal) for genocide. Not even Slobodan Milosević (though one finds newspaper and 
magazine articles where the contrary is asserted), who died invictus while in custody (as 
discussed in detail by Dickson and Jokic)
69
 was charged with this crime. The ICTY's ‘Second 
Amended Indictment
70
 expanded the charges against Milosević regarding Kosovo, but did not 
include charges of genocide.  
Most of Polizzi’s criticism I have responded to so far have to do with just the first 
paragraph of my Article on just war theory. Fortunately, Polizzi agrees with my criticism of 
this ‘theory’, particularly of the way Walzer has instrumentalized it in order to pronounce, 
which wars are just and which are not. Polizzi then appears to further develop my criticism 
by introducing additional references to Kant on necessity and an inspired use of the work by 
Agamben on sovereignty. I am not in the position to assess the value of his contribution, but I 
see the necessity to briefly reiterate the point of my referring to Kant in the context of 
criticizing Walzer’s use of the just war theory. 
My invocation of Kant’s view on the morality of war as ‘necessary evil’ served the 
purpose of showing the absurdity of Walzer’s reintroduction of the normative questions about 
war into the moral normative sphere. As I pointed out in my Article, the just war theory 
originated in the Catholic theological context, from where it quickly entered into the moral 
domain. Over a period of several centuries it underwent the process of secularization (taking 
it out of the theological and moral spheres) and by the end of the nineteenth century it was 
incorporated into the (international) legal order, a process that was finalized with the UN 
Charter after WWII. Kant had already pointed out, as Judith Shklar reminded us, that we 
better keep war completely within the legal normative order (and in particular out of the 
moral normative sphere) as any attempt to talk about the morality of war, or consider any war 
(morally) just, would only serve to encourage ‘people to enter upon wars recklessly and then 
baptizing his own side with the holy water of justice. Every enemy can easily be made to look 
the aggressor.’ But this is exactly what Walzer is doing by reintroducing just war theory into 
the moral normative order, and thus making it possible that situations arise when the choice 
could be made by well armed predatory countries in favour of the ‘illegal but good’ course of 
action; like in the case of the illegal aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, which was 
successfully spun in the Western media (and intelligence psychological operations) as 
somehow moral, for it (supposedly) served to allegedly prevent a genocide. That this is 
morally wrong and that it legally amounts to a war crime in both on the count of incitement 
by agitating in favour of aggression (an ad bellum crime) and in Walzer’s readiness to ex post 
facto redefine the rules of in bello laws, in case they are violated by the (good) US troops, in 
order to make those actions (supposedly) consistent with law (as redefined by him), should be 
entirely obvious to everyone. But there is nothing new to this argument and my objections. 
Richard Falk had identified these issues in his early review of Walzer’s Just and Unjust 
Wars, aptly titled ‘The Moral Argument as Apologia’, concluding that ‘Those who most 
deeply imperil the human prospect will be pleased to discover their moral vindication in 
Walzer’s book’.71 My Article simply developed further this very early insight by Falk. 
A similar example, to which we next turn, can be seen in the case of the conventional 
wisdom on Rwanda. 
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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON RWANDA 
 
An essential part of my criticism of Walzer’s utilization of the just war theory had to 
do with the following dictum: do not mix scholarship with activism (especially if the latter 
involves urging the initiation of wars of choice—aggressions—and violating customs of war). 
The example that illustrated the problem with this approach is, as we have seen, that of the 
Rwanda expert, Alison Des Forges, testifying in a Canadian court of law, in the case of Léon 
Mugesera, and asserting that as a human rights activist, she could not claim objectivity. This 
introduced the subject of Rwanda in 1994 into the discussion and gave the opportunity to 
Polizzi to weigh in on it:  
 
Regardless its relationship to just war theory, the genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo needed to be stopped 
for all in the violent cross-fire of that conflict. Does this action also make itself vulnerable to charges of 
hypocrisy, particularly when a similar type of genocide was taking place in Africa at approximately the 
same time and the Clinton administration and European countries stood shamelessly by while hundreds 
of thousands of civilians were butchered? Of course it does! Former President Clinton has admitted as 
much, calling the lack of US involvement in Rwanda one of the greatest failures of his presidency. 
Perhaps, even more shameful is the fact that he forbad his UN representatives from even using the 
word genocide in their official correspondences when describing the events in Rwanda, for fear that 
such a designation would require that the United States immediately respond to that situation. They did 
not and hundreds of thousands of Africans lost their lives. Hypocrisy? Of course!72 
 
What this passage from Polizzi does, in few words, is load into the discussion all elements of 
the ‘conventional wisdom’ on Rwanda. However, it is a scholarly mistake to accept 
conventional wisdom on Rwanda as factual while discussing just war theory—or for that 
matter anything else, which rests on factual accuracy. I would like to demonstrate this error in 
the remaining part of this Article. 
While we cannot fault Polizzi for something that almost everyone in the West who 
discusses Rwanda does (be they scholars or not), it is nevertheless a serious failure of 
scholarship to simply assume the conventional wisdom. This failure can be seen by focusing 
on an example of a genocide narrative, almost randomly selected, that in a very few words, 
just like Polizzi, presupposes the entire incorrect story of Rwanda, pushed for in the West. 
The example I shall use is an article by John K. Roth on genocide and philosophers of 
religion. 
In his article Roth makes very few remarks about Rwanda, yet it is clear even on the 
basis of this meagre content that he presupposes all elements of what passes for conventional 
wisdom on Rwanda of 1994, just like Polizzi did. This dominant or received rendition of the 





 and Philip Gourevich
75
; it was then widely transmitted by a 
copy-paste industry of sorts that continues to this day, despite some opposing and compelling 
evidence amassed by capable and credible researchers.
76
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Roth makes exactly four brief remarks about Rwanda from which it is evident that he 
presupposes the conventional wisdom on Rwanda. When referring to General Roméo 
Dallaire, Roth touts ‘his heroic efforts to stop genocide were thwarted by international 
inaction that included reluctance even to use the G word to identify the genocide that 
engulfed Rwanda in 1994’.77 This claim is remarkably similar to the one Polizzi makes. From 
this simple comment and attitude towards Dallaire we can reconstruct no less than five tenets 
of conventional wisdom on Rwanda in 1994: 
 
(G)  The tremendous violence that erupted in Rwanda in 1994 can primarily be 
characterized as genocide. 
(UN)  The UN role was heroic in a way it attempted to stop the genocide rather than 
being in any way complicit in the fact that violence happened. 
(I) Intervention was possible but there was no will in the West to do so, 
particularly in the US that suffered from the so-called ‘Somalia Syndrome’ or 
because the West had failed to classify expeditiously the relevant events as 
genocide. 
(PV)  The only form of political violence that took place in 1994 Rwanda was 
genocide. 
(A) The genocidal killings occurred all over Rwanda.78 
 
Next Roth quotes the entire list of violent episodes classified as genocides from a book where 
at spot number (15) we have ‘the Hutu campaign against Tutsi in Rwanda’.79 This suggests 
tenet (G) again, and 
 
(H)  The perpetrators were Hutu as the dominant, ruling ethnic group and the 
victims were the ethnic minority Tutsi. 
 
Talking about the ‘logic’ of circumstances in which genocide can happen Roth offers this 
example: ‘ “civil war” (Rwanda)’.80 This suggests the next tenet of the conventional wisdom: 
 
(CW)  The violence that engulfed Rwanda in 1994 was a civil war. 
 
Finally, writing about the effects of genocide Roth ponders: ‘How extensive was the damage 
to Tutsi existence as Hutu machetes did their worst?’81, which gives us the following element 
of the conventional wisdom: 
 
(M)  Killings that occurred during the episode of violence in Rwanda in 1994 were 
for the most part committed using machetes. 
 
In order to complete the list of claims that comprise conventional wisdom on Rwanda we can 
add just one more: 
 
                                                 
77 John K Roth, ‘Easy to Remember? Genocide and the Philosophy of Religion’ (2010) 68 International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 31, 32. 
78 See a very instructive lecture by Christian Davenport with a similar and related categorization of the 
conventional wisdom on Rwanda, ‘Rethinking Rwanda 1994’ at the Kroc institute, University of Notre Dame (8 
April 2010) < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vug3OxbpsFA > (accessed 19 May 2013). 
79 Ibid 34. 
80 Ibid 37. 
81 Ibid 35-36. 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA Aleksandar Jokic 
 
 24  
 
(R)  The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), then rebels but now the ruling party in 
Rwanda, had stopped the genocide by ending the civil war and taking control 
of the country (away from the Armed Forces of Rwanda or FAR). 
 
The nine claims enumerated above represent quite accurately the conventional 
wisdom on Rwanda in 1994 as it emerged from the key writings and repeated often enough 
that it resulted in a unified narrative both in the public and academic domains. We have seen 
that Roth (just as Polizzi does) relies uncritically on the conventional wisdom in the case of 
this violent episode. But are the claims on which conventional wisdom rests true? Can they 
survive proper scholarly scrutiny? 
It is not easy to question conventional wisdom, and doing so can be quite 
uncomfortable as those who ventured using appropriate methodology to research what 
actually happened in Rwanda during the hundred days of violence that later justified 
continued war and misery in the Democratic Republic of Congo causing the deaths of several 
more millions of people could testify. However, we can start by making a point with which 
all could agree. The proximate cause that triggered the large-scale massacres that followed 
was the shooting down of the Presidential plane. On the evening of April 6, 1994 at 20:25 the 
plane carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of 
Burundi was shot down by two surface-to-air missiles as it approached the international 
airport in Kigali. The plane operated by a French crew was returning the two Presidents and 
the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), General Deogratias Nsabimana, 
from a summit held in Dar es Salaam. One could hardly expect that this would become the 
most under-investigated presidential assassination and terrorist act in history. Still more 
deplorably, this event would soon become known simply as a ‘plane crash’. Thus, even the 
1999 ‘Report of the Independent Inquiry Into UN Actions During the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda’ commissioned by Kofi Annan contains a section titled ‘The Crash of the 
Presidential Plane: Genocide Begins’ though it is stated there that ‘at approximately 20:30 the 
plane was shot down as it was coming in to land in Kigali’.82 Similarly, Samantha Power 
starts her chapter on Rwanda describing how the news of the Presidential plane having ‘been 
shot down’83 was received by General Dallaire, only to become a ‘plane crash’ on the very 
next page and in all later references to this event.
84
 So have done countless others (journalists 
and scholars) in their writings about Rwanda of 1994. 
A major clarification regarding the shooting down of the Presidential plane 
specifically, and a decisive setback for the conventional wisdom on Rwanda in general 
occurred in November 2006, when the French anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguière 
issued a report and an international arrest warrant against current Rwandan President and 
leader of RPF Paul Kagame, for the deliberate assassination of President Habyarimana. 
Bruguière was of the view that Kagame knew full well that large scale massacres would 
ensue after the downing of the plane enabling him and the RPF to take complete power in 
Rwanda by force. Judge Bruguière's rigorous six-year investigation, along with more or less 
concurrent revelations about the elements from another investigation carried out by Michael 
Hourigan, an Australian lawyer and one of the lead investigators at the ICTR office of the 
Prosecutor, whose inquiry into the shooting down of the plane was personally shut down by 
                                                 
82 ‘Report of the Independent Inquiry into UN Actions During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ (1999) 15, 
available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement> 
(accessed 6 March 2013). 
83 Power (n 64) 329. 
84 Ibid 330, 354. 




the ICTR's Prosecutor Louise Arbour,
85
 and above all the testimony of Abdul Ruzibiza, a 
former RPF officer, before the ICTR provide decisive evidence that a ‘network commando’ 
of the RPF had shot down President Habyarimana's plane. Ruzibiza testified publicly at the 
ICTR that:  
 
The missiles came from Uganda in the month of January and they were transported to Mulindi; and, 
from Mulindi, the missiles were taken to Kigali in the month of February—if my memory is good… 
Sometimes I don't remember dates very well. And from within the Parliament building (CND) the 
missiles were brought to Masaka. And the missiles were transported in a UNAMIR military convoy.86  
 
Masaka is in the outskirts of Kigali near the airport, the area from which the missiles 
were fired. The evidence indicates that the Presidential plane was shot using missiles that 
were the property of the Ugandan Army purchased from the Soviet Union in 1987. The 
combination of judge Bruguière's report, Hourigan's investigation, and Ruzibiza's testimony 
is damning for the tenet of conventional wisdom labelled (UN) and in particular the former 
UN mission commander, General Roméo Dallaire: he was in charge of the so-called Kigali 
weapons secure area from where the missiles were shot, and if the missiles arrived to their 
tactical destination in a UNAMIR military convoy, then general Dallaire—far from being a 
hero who tried to stop the genocide as Roth and others claim—appears at best an incompetent 
military cadre and at worst an accomplice in the operation of putting the missiles in place for 
caring out the presidential assassinations and unleashing massacres that the RPF would use to 
grab power in Rwanda. This evidence is also damning for the tenet (R), since if the RPF shot 
down President Habyarimana’s plane, Kagame can no longer be deemed a heroic military 
genius who stopped a genocide. As we shall soon see there is another reason why (R) is false. 
That all tenets that make up conventional wisdom on Rwanda in 1994 are incorrect is 
shown in the research undertaken over the last fifteen years by Christian Davenport and Allan 
Stam,
87
 supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The team led by these 
two prolific and well-regarded political scientists has accumulated a huge body of data from 
many sources including the following: a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations that 
had compiled information about the killings; interviews with Rwandan government elites and 
a household survey of the Butare province during their study visit to the country; detailed 
maps that contained information on the location of the FAR military bases at the beginning of 
hostilities obtained with considerable difficulties from the ICTR; a preliminary database that 
ICTR prosecutors had compiled from thousands of eyewitness statements associated with the 
1994 violence, based on some 12,000 different people that this UN body had deposed that the 
research team compared with information found in CIA documents, other witness statements, 
academic studies of the violence; and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency information that 
documents approximate positions of the RPF units over the course of the war, which the 
research team updated using CIA national intelligence estimates obtained through the 
Freedom of Information Act and then updated again based on interviews with former RPF 
members, whose recollections the team corroborated with information from the FAR. 
                                                 
85 On this incident see Nick McKenzie, ‘UN 'shut down' UN Probe’ The Age (10 February 2010) available at 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/un-shut-down-rwanda-probe/2007/02/09/1170524298428.html> 
(accessed 6 November 2012). 
86Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, (Transcript) ICTR-98-41-T (March 10 2006) 44, lines 14-18 (my translation from 
French).  
87 The essential aspects of their work on Rwanda is presented and explained in detail in Christian Davenport and 
Allen C. Stam, “Genodynamics”, National Science funded data collection effort and analysis of 1994 Rwandan 
genocide Http://www.genodynamics.com (accessed 6 May 2013). See also Davenport and Allen C. Stam, 
“What Really Happened in Rwanda?” (6 October 2009) 2 Miller-McCune, available at 
<http://www.psmag.com/politics/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432/> (accessed 6 May 2013). 
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Using the data compiled from all these sources the research team of Davenport and 
Stam was able to code events during the 100 days of violence by times, places, perpetrators, 
victims, weapon type and actions enabling us to better understand what really happened in 
Rwanda in 1994. Having documented where killings took place and using the maps that 
showed the relative positions of the FAR and the RPF over time, Davenport and Stam were 
able to relate these deaths to the changes of the battlefronts and conflict zones presenting all 
this as an animation using sophisticated computer software. Particularly useful is the 
animation of violent deaths and troop overlays showing troop movements and zones of 
control with median estimates of daily killings during the 100 days of massacres. The data 
accumulated and their visual presentations by this team of researchers suggest a number of 
conclusions about what went on in Rwanda conflict with respect to all tenets of the 
conventional wisdom. 
Anyone who was to consult the material described above would quickly realize that 
claims (A) and (CW) are incorrect. The data clearly show that not all of Rwanda was 
engulfed in violence at the same time. Rather, the violence spread from one locale to another, 
and the movements of the RPF dictated the direction and pace of killings. This is what 
Davenport and Stam judge as their most shocking finding: The killings in the zone controlled 
by the FAR would escalate as the RPF moved into the country and acquired more territory. 
When the RPF advanced, large-scale killings escalated in the areas directly across the moving 
frontline. When the RPF stopped, large-scale killings also mostly stopped. This is another 
reason why the tenet (R) of conventional wisdom is false as the data show that much of the 
killing would not have taken place if the RPF had simply called a halt to its invasion. 
The much-neglected aspect of Rwanda in 1994 is the international character of the 
conflict, which meant that this was not simply a civil war. The moment the President was 
assassinated the RPF moved into action not just from its bases in the north of the country and 
the centre of Kigali that the RPF controlled as a result of the Arusha Accords, but the RPF 
started a full blown military invasion, which constituted an aggression against Rwanda from 
Uganda by the RPF. It should be noted that many leading members of the RPF were officers 
in the Ugandan army, including Paul Kagame, and that the aggression was mounted using 
Ugandan military materiel. This was the second such aggression after the FAR repelled a 
similar attack on the country by the RPF in 1990, followed by a series of political agreements 
reached by the two parties, which should have seen the RPF and the FAR both partially 
demobilized and reintegrated into a national army. Contrary to what could have been 
reasonably expected after the signature of the Arusha Accords, the RPF failed to transform 
into a political party that would participate in the upcoming elections and even shared the 
power.
88
 Instead, as a result of the simultaneous attack on the presidential plane and invasion 
from Uganda violence that erupted must be given a character of both international 
(aggression) and civil war. The plausibility of the tenet (CW) is further diminished by the 
finding of Davenport and Stam according to which, contrary to the claims by the Tutsis 
outside the country to have invaded Rwanda from Uganda on behalf of the Tutsis inside, the 
invading force actually had a primary goal of conquest and little regard for the lives of Tutsis 
residing in Rwanda. In fact, the Tutsi diaspora who were largely English and Swahili 
speaking had very little awareness about the living conditions of, or contacts with, Tutsi 
Rwandans who spoke Kinyarwanda and French, and who were well integrated in the 
Rwandan society. It is hardly a stretch to think that invading Tutsi military must have 
appeared as proper foreigners even to Rwandan Tutsis, making the classification of this 
conflict as international aggression even more appropriate.  
                                                 
88 For a more detailed account of the institutional framework in place at the time see the chapter entitled 
‘Antécédents’ in Filip Reynjens, Rwanda: Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire (L’Harmattan 1995) 15-19. 




Much of the research by Davenport and Stam is concerned with the nature of killings 
that took place with a direct bearing on the claims (G), (H) and (PV) that are parts of 
conventional wisdom. The best available data allow us to reconstruct where the violence took 
place, the types of killing that occurred, as well as the identity of victims and perpetrators. 
While the violence did seem to begin in the FAR controlled area it must be underscored that 
it also took place in the RPF-captured territory, and along the (clockwise moving) front 
between the two warring parties. In order to understand the nature of the hundred day killings 
one must keep track of the events in these three shifting spatial segments (areas controlled by 
the FAR, areas controlled by the RPF, and the frontline). The data show that multiple 
processes of violence took place simultaneously: many of the killings were spontaneous or 
opportunistic killings to settle political, economic and personal scores with Hutus and Tutsis 
playing the roles of both attackers and victims; in the territory controlled by the government’s 
FAR Hutu victims significantly outnumber the killed Tutsis, which suggests that a 
government’s attempts to exterminate an ethnic group—that is, genocide—was hardly the 
only motive for the killing in the FAR controlled territory; and in the RPF controlled areas 
large-scale killings happened in refugee camps, and in individual households where the RPF 
targeted among others the Hutu elites. Hence, the killings were perpetrated by government 
forces, by the RPF rebels, and by citizens engaged in opportunistic killings.  
The complex picture of the violence that emerges from this study suggests that 
genocide was just one of many forms of violence that took place simultaneously. 
Furthermore, when Davenport and Stam compared reported deaths from all different sources 
that were consulted they quickly concluded that there were not enough Tutsis in Rwanda to 
account for all the killed. Consulting the census of 1991 we obtain the number of 
approximately 600,000 Tutsis in Rwanda at that time and if we subtract from this number the 
300,000 who, according to Ibuka, the Tutsi survivors organization,
89
lived through the 
violence, we get the actual number of killed Tutsi. Depending on the estimate of the total 
number of victims we take into consideration we can conclude that the number of Hutus 
killed is either comparable to or vastly greater than the number of killed Tutsis. If we take the 
usually cited numbers suggesting that 800,000 to 1 million had been killed, then the killed 
Hutus outnumber the killed Tutsis by a 3 to 1 ratio, or more. All of this goes to show that 
claims (G), (H) and (PV) are false. Also contrary to the conventional wisdom, and tenet (M), 
the research shows that most deaths were caused by military weaponry.  
The complex picture of Rwandan violence portrayed by this research found instant 
critics, and provoked not only anger by the regime in Rwanda but also accusations of 
genocide denial. This has been the most curious outcome since Davenport and Stam had 
never denied that a genocide took place—in fact, their estimate is that there were some 
100,000 genocidal killings—but have concluded in their research that genocide was only 
one—and not the principal—form of violence that occurred in 1994. The complaints against 
these researchers appear to be based on a specific and widespread attitude regarding 
Rwandan killings. We have already encountered the ‘genocide or nothing’ attitude and the 
corrosive effect it has on scholarship (when it exhibits what I called ‘activism in 
scholarship’), but here we see a similar attitude we may call ‘nothing but genocide’ that 
prevents one from actually grasping (or even wanting to) what really happened in Rwanda. 
However, claims (G) and (H) cannot be sustained by sheer insistence and stubbornness, 
particularly if they clash with our best data. 
                                                 
89 It must be noted, however, that this is an extremely partisan organization and that this estimate of theirs must 
be taken as very conservative, and thus indicative of the very real possibility that in fact many more Tutsis 
survived, which only means that if the number of total victims is kept steady that many more Hutus were among 
the victims. 
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It remains to consider the tenet (I) of the conventional wisdom. Davenport and Stam 
did not see intervention of any sort as a possibility in Rwanda. Their main reason is the fact 
that almost the entire population of Rwanda was on the move. Everyone tried to either leave 
the country or at least avoid finding themselves right in front of the point of contact between 
the FAR and the RPF, where most of the killings took place. In my judgment, the most 
significant finding of Davenport and Stam is that in Rwanda people got killed not because of 
who they were but because of who they were not. With almost everybody on the move and the 
fact that the Hutus and the Tutsis are physically indistinct from one another, people got killed 
because they were perceived as non-locals who as such were seen as presenting a threat (as 
fifth column infiltrators or criminally minded opportunists). Rwandans tragically found 
themselves in a situation when one could not meaningfully assert who he or she was, but it 
could be fairly clear who one was not, in the sense of being a non-local person, not from here, 
not one of us; therefore presenting danger that must be removed. This is of huge conceptual 
importance as the nature of killings appears as an exact mirror image of genocide. Perhaps we 
should give it a separate label. I would propose aliundecide, from Latin words ‘aliunde’ 
meaning ‘those from another place’ and ‘cide’ for ‘killing’. Even if somehow justified or 
desired, a foreign military intervention with any chance of success in such a context seems 




In this Article, using examples of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, I have engaged the 
question about the proper place for conventional wisdom within scholarship or academic 
debates. While the practice of identifying the main tenets of conventional wisdom regarding 
violent historical episodes, such as the dismantling of Yugoslavia or the hundred-day killing 
in Rwanda, and seeking evidence that supports or counters those claims can be entirely 
legitimate and methodologically justified; the opposite practice, however, is objectionable 
both on the moral and methodological grounds. Namely, simply presupposing conventional 
wisdom within a work of scholarly research or an academic polemic must be seen as a 
particularly grave mistake: the Appeal to Conventional Wisdom fallacy. The mistake is that 
much more serious if it can be demonstrated, as I attempted show here with respect to 
Rwanda, that all tenets of conventional wisdom about a case are false. In a situation like that 
it, then, becomes egregiously obvious that it is methodologically and morally objectionable to 
espouse conventional wisdom in light of the fact that contrary and compelling evidence is 
readily available. 
I have argued that the appeals to conventional wisdom, in the academic context, are in 
most cases associated with the phenomenon of ‘activism in scholarship’. As theorized by 
Pierre Bourdieu, the proper engagement for a scholar must be outside academia but relying 
on the tools of her specialization to accomplish politically meaningful interventions. He 
rejects, however, ‘activism in scholarship’ as a threat to autonomy of the field within which it 
were to be manifest, for its presence in any field signals dependence with respect to external 
economic, political or religious powers, which erodes any symbolic authority necessary for 
proper civic engagement. Thus, scholars who promote various tenets of conventional wisdom 
about any (geo)politically important (violent) episode, such as cases discussed here regarding 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, within their academic work, not only exhibit a kind of 
methodological incompetence, but through this practice they open up the spectrum of 
potentially weakening the autonomous character of their discipline and hence draining the 
symbolic power of scholarship, which is necessary in the first place for the possibility of 
making an intellectuel engagé out of any scholar. Thus, activist scholars are a danger to their 
own disciplines. I think, however, one would be justified in arguing for a broader point. The 




instrumentalization of this kind of one’s own research discipline is morally impermissible, 
which was one of my original objections to Walzer. 
Consequently, once recognized that conventional wisdom (be it on Yugoslavia or 
Rwanda or anything else) is incorrect on significant counts, it becomes imperative that it is 
methodologically and morally objectionable to espouse conventional wisdom in one’s 
scholarship given that contrary and compelling evidence is readily available. 
  
